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Abstract:
A federal emergency was declared in Flint, Michigan on January 16, 2016 because of elevated lead levels in
the city drinking water system. Resulting from a number of technical mistakes and a lack of oversight by the
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, this crisis may have implications for the professional practice
of emergency management. This paper explores the relationship between critical infrastructure and disaster
theory, reviews the Flint crisis as a representative case study, and presents recommendations for emergency
managers to begin to assess the drinking water systems within their own communities. As this is a still-evolving
event, the discussion is based on the extent of the information available to both researchers and the public
primarily as of late Fall, 2016. Future researchers will need to evaluate records from upcoming court proceedings
and file additional FOIA requests after all subpoenas have been lifted in order to analyze how both a large public
water system and a state government could allow the omission of corrosion control.
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1

Introduction

The term emergency manager has different meanings within various contexts. The state of Michigan uses the term
emergency manager to denote certain political appointees that govern municipalities and report directly to the
governor. However, this paper uses the term in its broader sense to refer to professionals that seek to reduce
disaster-related risk within their communities. Likewise, this paper uses the term emergency management to
denote the profession associated with community risk reduction.
The scope of emergency management appears to be constantly evolving. The January 16, 2016 Flint, Michigan drinking water crisis has established that a lack of safe drinking water may trigger both state and federal
emergency declarations. Emergency managers across the country may now be expected to participate more
heavily in the provision of a safe and reliable drinking water supply for their communities. The techniques
available to emergency managers to reduce risk associated with their drinking water supplies are still emerging. This paper explores how critical infrastructure fits within disaster theory, reviews the Flint crisis as a case
study, and offers options for emergency managers to engage with their own drinking water purveyors to reduce
risk.
In the United States, each drinking water system is categorized based on various criteria. A public water
system (PWS) “provides water for human consumption through pipes or other constructed conveyances to at
least 15 service connections or serves an average of at least 25 people for at least 60 days a year” (Environmental
Protection Agency (EPAa) (n.d.), n.d. n.p.). The term public refers to consumers, as either public or private
entities may own or operate a PWS. All other drinking water systems are considered a non-PWS. (A typical nonPWS would be a well that serves one small building.) Each PWS is further divided into one of three categories:
community water system (CWS), non-transient non-community water system (NTNCWS), or transient noncommunity water system (TNCWS). Finally, each PWS may be considered either regulated or non-regulated,
primarily depending on whether they treat water (40 CFR 141.3, 2016). CWSs are demarcated from non-CWSs
because they serve residents, versus people. A NTNCWS differs from a TNCWS because the former serves the
same people for at least six months per year. The classification of drinking water systems is summarized in
Figure 1.
Mark Paine is the corresponding author.
©2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.
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Figure 1: Drinking Water System Classification.
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Drinking water may flow through multiple PWSs before reaching a final consumer. For example, a military
installation may have an unregulated, distribution-only PWS that purchases all of its drinking water from a municipal supplier. In turn, the municipal supplier may be attached to the PWS of a larger water district. Therefore,
an individual on this hypothetical military installation may draw drinking water that passed through three
different systems: the installation’s exempted distribution-only system, the municipal system, and the water
district. Flint, between 1967 and 2014, procured water that originated from a PWS in Detroit then received it
into their own PWS. The crisis in Flint was initiated when the city stopped purchasing water from Detroit and
began producing and treating their own water from the Flint River without proper procedures or oversight in
place. This decision resulted in elevated levels of lead in the drinking water. Flint reverted back to purchasing
water from Detroit after this discovery, although the existing damage to the distribution system continues to
result in elevated lead levels for the residents.
The crisis in Flint raises questions for communities across the country. What controls are in place to prevent
a similar disaster elsewhere? Existing disaster theory may provide insight into how drinking water could be
compromised, even in large municipalities that are overseen by their respective state governments. The Flint
crisis also presents an opportunity to examine how safety protections may fail, particularly during periods of
change. The lessons from disaster theory and the Flint crisis can also be combined to develop potential methods
of mitigating risk in drinking water systems in other communities.

2

Critical Infrastructure and Disaster Theory

Critical infrastructure, as defined by the Department of Homeland Security, provides vital services to communities [Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2003); 42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)]. Examples of vital services include
drinking water, electric power, or natural gas. In the scholarly literature, critical infrastructure may be categorized as large technical systems (LTSs) (Joerges 1988). A significant failure of a LTS associated with infrastructure could possibly lead to either a public health or ecological disaster, or both. Scholars within the field of
emergency management seek to better understand societal risk resulting from the failure of an LTS in order to
reduce the potential for harm. Numerous factors, such as industrial accidents, natural disasters, or terrorism,
may contribute to the failure of an LTS.
Traditional disaster theory may categorize a hazard posed by an LTS as either a technological hazard (McEntire 2004) or an industrial hazard (Perrow 2007). The former designation suggests that technology itself, rather
than the human factors associated with system design and operation, presents the problem. Perrow’s (1999)
presentation of normal accident theory (NAT) supports such a proposition by arguing that highly complex and
tightly coupled systems are inherently risky. Human factors become an issue within NAT when management
makes decisions that increase either the complexity or coupling of technological systems. In contrast, Perrow
(2007) defines industrial hazards in terms of a direct relationship between human factors and technology. Industrial hazards result from systemic risk associated with a man-machine interface.
Emergency managers have experience assessing vulnerability associated with terrorism and natural disasters. However, assessing the risk presented by industrial systems, such as a public utility, presents an emerging
challenge. Emergency managers may gain insights from a group of professionals termed “reliability professionals” (Schulman et al. 2004, p. 24). Reliability professionals are technicians and middle managers who are
2
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responsible for safely running LTSs associated with critical infrastructure. They have legal obligations to protect
both workers and the public. In addition, they are required to maintain appropriate technological skillsets in
order to reduce risk. In short, they have the skills that are required in order to properly assess and prevent risks
posed by LTSs.
Reliability professionals may be design engineers, government regulators, quality assurance experts, or hold
other job classifications. The successful application of their craft requires both technical knowledge and a commitment to protecting the health and safety of others. This commitment is exemplified by Voronov and Weber
(2016) with their assertion that “emotions are central to the very constitution of people as competent institutional actors who hold a personal stake in an institution” (p. 456). In other words, a reliability professional must
maintain an awareness of their responsibility for the safety of others at all times. In addition, their responsibilities may often be outlined in professional codes or legal requirements. Reliability professionals may be held
accountable when their efforts result in the illness, injury, or death of others.
Emergency management as a whole lacks a unified theory (Van der Waldt 2013). In contrast, LTSs have
paradoxical archetypes (La Porte 1996). High reliability organizations (HROs) assert that risk can be eliminated
by establishing ideal business processes. Alternately, normal accident theory (NAT) holds that failures are inevitable within an LTS when levels of complexity and tight coupling are elevated (Perrow 1999). Therefore,
HRO theory states that an accident will never occur in some organizations while NAT suggests that an accident
will always occur at some point within all organizations. A consensus resolution between these two theories
remains elusive. Future developments within these theories may enable a better understanding of how reliability professionals, for example, within the drinking water industry, may work together to prevent catastrophic
results.
The role of reliability professionals inevitably gets reviewed after industrial disasters. Human factors may be
viewed from within several different perspectives, generally the “person approach” or the “system approach”
(Reason 2000, n.p.). The person approach seeks to find fault in the actions of individuals and is likely to result in a conclusion of operator error. In contrast, the system approach focuses on the entire context in which
humans operate. For example, production pressure that results in unrealistic expectations may be cited for motivating unsafe behavior. Additionally, the system approach allows senior managers to be held accountable if
they assign unqualified personnel to operate as reliability professionals as a cost savings measure. The case
study of the Flint crisis presents an example where most scholars have utilized the system approach to explain
what happened although the Michigan attorney general is bound to the person approach that seeks to assign
personal responsibility.
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Flint Drinking Water Crisis

A Joint Select Committee on the Flint Water Emergency (Joint Select Committee) (2016) report summarizes
the history of how citizens in Flint have received their drinking water. Prior to 1967, the city utilized the Flint
River as its source of drinking water. Between 1967 and 2014, water was purchased from the Detroit Water and
Sewerage Department (DWSD). In 2013, Flint entered the Karegnondi Water Authority and was scheduled to
have its own pipeline from Lake Huron by 2016. After learning of Flint’s new plan, the DWSD then canceled the
supply contract and the two parties were not able to successfully renegotiate. Therefore, Flint was left without
a viable water source between 2014 and the projected completion of the new pipeline in 2016. In response, Flint
decided to utilize the Flint River on a temporary basis.
In April, 2014, Flint began drawing drinking water from the Flint River, which “triggered a cascade of events
that directly resulted in the contribution of lead” into the drinking water system that supplies almost 100,000
people (Giles 2016, p. 9). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) still has “advice to Flint residents” on its
website which states “DO NOT drink unfiltered water. It is not safe!” (Environmental Protection Agency (EPAb)
(n.d), n.d. n.p.). A combination of state and local reliability professionals have been criminally charged by the
Michigan attorney general [Joint Select Committee on the Flint Water Emergency (Joint Select Committee) (2016)
and State of Michigan, Office of the Attorney General (MI AG) (n.d)]. A permanent solution for the citizens of
Flint has not yet been funded.
In general, the lead that ends up in drinking water typically comes from within the plumbing system of a
particular structure. Piping, solder, or fixtures that contain lead, especially those that have been installed prior
to 1986, may transfer it directly to the drinking water. If a plumbing system contains lead, then increased contact
time with the water will result in higher levels of contamination compared to the source water. For example, if a
house sits vacant for six months, and the plumbing system contains lead, then the water sitting its pipes would
likely contain elevated levels. It is possible to reduce the quantity of lead by flushing the system, or running
the water through a faucet for a period of time. Lead sampling requires that water remain stagnant for at least
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six hours so that the water is known to have had contact time with the structure’s plumbing. Pre-flushing is a
practice whereby the technician, or someone else at the technician’s direction, flushes the system before starting
the six-hour clock prior to collecting a sample for lead.
A review of federal regulations for monitoring lead in tap water did not reveal any prohibitions on preflushing prior to collecting samples (40 CFR 141.86(b)). A federal EPA memorandum recommends against preflushing, although it stopped short of banning it. Specifically, the memorandum stated “EPA recommends that
sampling instructions not contain a pre-stagnation flushing step” (Grevatt 2016, p. 2). Michigan Radio, a National Public Radio (NPR) station, published a story referring to pre-flushing as a “common water testing practice” (Smith 2016, n.p.). The Michigan attorney general has brought criminal charges against a technician in Flint
for recommending residents to pre-flush before lead samples were taken. The NPR story noted that industry
professionals are watching to see what the outcome of the criminal charges will be, given that pre-flushing is
considered a common practice.
One possible explanation for federal EPA reluctance to ban pre-flushing is that it may be appropriate in
some cases. For example, if a home has been vacant for a period of days or longer, then the sampled water may
have higher lead levels than would be experienced during routine use. Apparently for this purpose, the Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs advises technicians to “not collect samples in
the morning after vacations, weekends, or holidays because the water will have remained stagnant for too long
and would not represent the water used for drinking during most days of the week” [Massachusetts Executive
Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs (MA EEA) (n.d), n.d. n.p.]. (It may be useful for the federal EPA to
clarify when pre-flushing is acceptable, given that they have recommended against it but have not prohibited
the practice.)
Drinking water originates as source water, typically either from groundwater or surface water such as a lake
or river. If the water is corrosive and the distribution system contains lead products, then the corrosive water
will expedite the leaching of lead into drinking water. For this reason, water purveyors and state regulatory
agencies both have duties to protect PWSs from corrosive source water. The Lead and Copper Rule, promulgated through 40 CFR 141.80–91, requires both monitoring of source water and corrosion control treatment.
The American Water Works Association (AWWA) (2014) notes that corrosion control can be provided through
multiple methods “including the addition of chemicals (e.g. orthophosphates) to create a barrier between the
pipes and the drinking water, or the modification of drinking water chemistry (such as pH and hardness) to
inhibit the potential for corrosion” (p. 1).
The federal EPA stated that during the Flint crisis “the presence of lead in the City [of Flint] water supply
is principally due to the lack of corrosion control treatment after the City’s switch to the Flint River as a source
in 2014” (Giles 2016, p. 5). This statement suggests, much like the assertions of the Michigan attorney general,
that reliability professionals failed in their duty to protect the citizens of Flint from corrosive source water.
The population, therefore, experienced elevated lead levels in their drinking water. Proper corrosion control
would not have eliminated the pre-existing lead within the city’s distribution system, although it would have
prevented widespread leaching of lead from the system into the drinking water.
Perspectives relating to the root cause of the Flint crisis vary although they are primarily focused on the
systems approach, finding fault with the actions and decisions of senior managers. Greenberg (2016) concluded
that a primary component to the Flint crisis was an overall governmental focus on terrorism risk rather than
imminent risks to public health. Douglas (2016) attributed the crisis to mismanagement from the governor, who
had delivered on his promise to run the government like a business. Orlando (2016) primarily concluded that
the root cause was a societal overreliance on harmful chemicals, of which the Flint crisis is only one symptom.
In contrast, the Michigan attorney general had an obligation to utilize the person approach and it resulted in
criminal charges against reliability professionals at both the state and local level.
Egan (2016) noted that the primary authors of the Joint Select Committee’s report placed most of the blame
on reliability professionals at the state and local levels. However, a dissenting member of the committee, who
claimed not to have had the opportunity to review the final report, indicated that senior leaders such as the
governor and his appointees, should have been attributed a greater degree of culpability. One area of future
research would be an exploration of the culpability of various types of stakeholders with respect to the final outcomes of environmental health disasters. Such research may be beneficial because until a better understanding
is reached, other PWSs in other states may also experience disasters similar to Flint.
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) is the primary regulatory driver of safe drinking water requirements
in the United States and it regulates each PWS. Systems that do not meet this definition, such as a well that
serves a single-family home, are not regulated by the SDWA. The federal EPA maintains a Safe Drinking Water
Information System (SDWIS) online and it is accessible without registration to anyone with Internet access (Safe
Drinking Water System (SDWIS) (n.d) n.d.). The SDWIS, although it has limitations, may be utilized as a tool
to identify the PWSs located within a particular county.
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Enforcement authority of the SDWA, known as primacy, is delegated to state governments, rather than being
retained by the federal EPA, with only a few exceptions. The federal EPA only retains primacy in “Wyoming,
the District of Columbia, and throughout all of Indian country, other than the Navajo Nation” [Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) (2009), p. 4]. There is not a standardized nomenclature for state agencies that maintain primacy over drinking water. Michigan, for example, maintains primacy through their Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) while Florida utilizes a Department of Environmental Protection. In the Flint crisis, the
Michigan DEQ had a duty to the public to enforce the SDWA, even though the SDWA is a federal law.
In most cases, consumers obtain water from a PWS, which is overseen by a primacy agency. Detroit, Michigan, for example, serves a population 713,777 [Safe Drinking Water System (SDWIS) (n.d) n.d.], operates
through the DWSD, and has a PWS identification number of MI0001800. Flint serves a population of 99,763
[Safe Drinking Water System (SDWIS) (n.d) n.d.] through its Department of Public Works and has a PWS identification number of MI0001310. It is possible for a consumer to drink water that has passed through two or
more separate PWSs. In Detroit, the residents drink treated surface water from a single PWS, which they own.
In Flint, the residents currently drink water from the Flint PWS, which purchases all of its water from the DWSD.
Commonly, PWSs are referred to by the name of the owning municipal authority.
Flint, as the owner of a PWS, is legally responsible for providing safe drinking water to its nearly 100,000 residents. The Michigan DEQ, as the primacy agency, must provide oversight over Flint. The Flint PWS, although
owned by the City of Flint, is a distinct entity. Nothing in the SDWA prohibited Flint from directing its PWS
to utilize the Flint River to obtain their drinking water, even if utilizing a new source of water were to increase
risk. However, the switch to the new source was required to maintain compliance with both the SDWA and
Michigan state law. A Michigan Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request has been filed to obtain copies of
the required documentation, in reference to engineering and technical plans, to make the switch to the Flint
River (Paine 2016). Although the formal response has not yet been finalized, an interim response and private
communication indicate that the Michigan DEQ has essentially denied the majority of the FOIA request due to
those documents being under subpoena.
In the Flint crisis, it is clear that water from the Flint River was inappropriately treated. It is also documented that the appointed officials in charge of Flint initiated changes to their drinking water system as a cost
savings measure. Criminal charges were filed against the former appointed officials, Darnell Earley and Gerald
Ambrose, on December 20, 2016 (Davey and Smith 2016). The office of the Michigan attorney general also asserts that Flint’s external water experts inaccurately declared the system to be operating in compliance with the
law and that a DEQ employee also fradulently certified the Flint water treatment plant. However, no criminal
charges appear to have been specifically filed directly related to the omission of a corrosion control program.
Federal EPA employee Miguel del Toral identified this problem on February 27, 2015 and an Michigan DEQ employee responded back that Flint “Has an Optimized Corrosion Control Program” (Various 2015). It remains
possible that the subpoenaed documents, which are known to be under subpoena due to the FOIA request, are
being used to prepare another round of criminal charges.
News reports indicate that the reliability professionals in Flint relied on external technical consultants as
they transitioned to the use of water from the Flint River. Halcom (2016) identified Lockwood, Andrews, and
Newnam Incorporated and Veolia North America Incorporated as consultants to Flint. They re-designed the
treatment plant and validated the treatment process, respectively (Halcom 2016). Michigan state law also requires the Michigan DEQ to provide oversight when a PWS transitions its water sources. Not enough information is currently available to precisely pinpoint the technical mistakes of Flint, the Michigan DEQ, or the water
consultants. Future researchers that examine records of the ongoing, but as of yet incomplete, court proceedings
or that file FOIA requests after the subpoena has been lifted may be able to conduct further analysis.
In the case of the Flint water crisis, it was the reliability professionals at the federal EPA that first initiated governmental remediation actions. Reporting by Katz (2016) shows that the federal EPA could have acted
sooner, based on the work of an employee named Miguel Del Toral. In addition, the Joint Select Committee
on the Flint Water Emergency (Joint Select Committee) (2016) credits the early work of the team members of
the Flint Water Study with triggering the response. Members of the community were integral as well in early
intervention, as they facilitated the actions of both the federal EPA and the Flint Water Study. Although the federal EPA acted later than they could have, they were still the first governmental organization to provide some
relief to the citizens of Flint. In contrast, reliability professionals with the Michigan DEQ and Flint engaged in
behavior that resulted in criminal charges. The federal government, however, is not immune to lapsing on commitments to public safety. Perrow (2007) cites an example where the Connecticut Department of Public Utility
Control intervened with the unsafe practices of a nuclear power plant after the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
failed to act.
Several reviews, formal and informal, have been conducted on the Flint water crisis. The Flint Water Study,
which is run by “an independent research team from Virginia Tech volunteering” their time provides updates
to the public through their website (Flint Water Study, n.d. n.p.). A primary focus of the Flint Water Study is
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documenting the extent of the lead contamination and developing long-term solutions for the city. In addition,
the Michigan state legislature has appointed a Joint Select Committee. The Joint Select Committee was primarily
focused on changes to program administration in order to prevent future crises. One area for future study is
the failure of the administrative and technical process associated with switching from one source of drinking
water to another. Currently, the source information required for an analysis of the root cause of the Flint water
crisis remains sealed from both the public and researchers.
An inconsistency regarding the relationship between PWSs and the Michigan DEQ also necessitates further
research. The Joint Select Committee stated that the Michigan DEQ “determined that the Flint WTP did not have
to immediately utilize corrosion control treatment upon switching to the Flint River as a water source” (Joint
Select Committee on the Flint Water Emergency (Joint Select Committee) (2016), p. 6). This does not appear
to be in compliance with Michigan State Law 325.1004, which states that waterworks systems, not the DEQ,
are responsible for “filing plans and specifications; general plan, evaluation of proposed system” and other
documents associated with their operations. Which is correct? Either waterworks need to submit plans to the
DEQ for approval, as written in state law, or the DEQ internally determines when plans need to be submitted.
There are also conflicting reports regarding the DEQ position on the Flint PWS corrosion control plan during
the switch to the Flint River. One position of the Michigan DEQ is that they believed that an effective corrosion
control plan was in place (Various 2015; Williams and Smith 2015). A second position of the Michigan DEQ is
that they permitted the Flint PWS to avoid having a corrosion control plan while lead sampling was ongoing
[Joint Select Committee on the Flint Water Emergency (Joint Select Committee) (2016) and Lynch (2015)]. If they
believed an effective plan was in place, then they would either be negligent in their oversight or they would have
been misled by Flint employees. However, if they approved the omission of a corrosion control plan then they
may have violated both federal and state regulations. The FOIA request which was submitted, if it had been
successful, would have provided a copy of the corrosion control plan that the Michigan DEQ had approved
(if any) at the time Flint started drawing water from the Flint River. The results of omitting corrosion control
have already received deserved attention, although an understanding of how corrosion control was omitted
still requires further investigation.
The results of the Flint water crisis are starting to generate discussion of a permanent solution to lead service
lines (LSL) throughout the country. The California governor, on September 27, 2016, signed a law that requires
all PWSs to inventory LSLs and generate a timeline for replacement [California Legislative Information (California) (n.d) n.d.]. The federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (2016) has also published a white paper
that cites a National Drinking Water Advisory Council recommendation to begin LSL replacement. Although
federal action on LSL replacement may be delayed, California is already beginning to take action. Flint has a
much more immediate crisis, although no solution has yet been funded.

4

Role of Professional Emergency Managers

Professional emergency managers may take advantage of existing resources to better understand the threats
to drinking water within their communities. The SDWIS may be accessed online and is a quick method of
performing a basic search for PWSs within a community [Safe Drinking Water System (SDWIS) (n.d) n.d.].
The SDWIS is susceptible to data errors like any other database, although it may be useful for initial research.
Once drinking water systems are identified, a number of reports may be useful in identifying vulnerabilities. A
consumer confidence report (CCR) must be produced annually by each CWS and is typically readily accessible
either online or through a phone call. Unlike a CCR, a PWS’s water vulnerability assessment (WVA) will not be
available through public sources.
One red flag when reviewing drinking water system vulnerability is the presence of chlorine gas cylinders,
because they can release a large and dangerous vapor cloud. Switching from chlorine gas to sodium hypochlorite, which is a powder, can eliminate a significant hazard to a community. In addition to a WVA produced
by the PWS, the primacy agency may also have sanitary surveys on file for drinking water systems. A sanitary survey may indicate likely problems related to lack of maintenance, uncertified or untrained personnel,
or other vulnerabilities that may typically be out of mind for emergency managers. Emergency managers may
also be able to engage directly with leadership of large PWSs before they begin large projects or initiate unusual
changes, such as switching from the use of a lake to the use of a river for source water.
The federal government only plays a small role in the routine operation of a PWS. State governments, as
primacy agents, typically provide direct oversight over PWSs. Emergency managers may have to work with
both local and state reliability professionals in order to develop a full understanding of the vulnerabilities to
a community’s water supply. The federal government does, however, play a role in implementing the SDWA

6

DE GRUYTER

Paine and Kushma

through the federal EPA in extreme cases. For example, in Flint the federal government had to assist in the
declaration of an emergency as a result of water contamination.
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Discussion

Reliability professionals that work within the drinking water industry have the potential to either prevent or
initiate environmental health disasters within a community. In the case of Flint, reliability professionals at both
the local and state levels failed to protect the population. However, the Flint disaster would have been difficult
to prevent given the alleged criminal behavior on the part of both the local water purveyor and the state-level
regulators. This complex situation must now be considered by emergency managers, given that contaminated
drinking water may result in declared emergencies at both the state and federal levels. A number of existing
resources already exist, such as SDWIS and sanitary surveys, which emergency managers may utilize to better
understand the threats to the drinking water systems within their own communities.
Any time a large PWS changes its source water, there is an opportunity for increased risk. However, there
is nothing inherently improper in switching from one drinking water source to another. It is not immediately
clear if the charges against Earley and Ambrose were for the switch itself, or for mishandling of the crisis. Does
the Michigan attorney general office think that these two appointed officials could have known if the external
engineering firms and the Michigan DEQ were both committing fraud, as alleged? The real mistake was that
the transition was not properly planned or overseen, to the point that criminal charges have been levied. But
how, in the face of alleged criminal negligence on the part of both engineers and the state regulatory agency,
does a political leader provide proper oversight?
The lack of corrosion control was the root cause of the failure. However, further information is needed
in order to better assess the exact nature of how both a large PWS and its primacy agency could allow the
omission of a corrosion control program. Were the reliability professionals competent but deviant actors? Or,
were they incompetent actors in over their heads who did not really know what they were doing? Existing
research from activists, academics, reporters, and prosecutors already describes the negative effects of the Flint
disaster. However, the public is still not aware of how a corrosion control program was omitted. The denial of
the FOIA request that was submitted to prepare for this article indicates that a full understanding of the root
cause of the Flint crisis will need to be provided by future researchers. Future researchers will need to monitor
court proceedings and file additional FOIA requests after the subpoena has been lifted.
An employee of Flint has been criminally charged as a result of requesting residents to flush their water
lines prior to pulling a water sample to analyze for lead. This activity has been described by news reporting
as a widespread practice. This means that we either have law enforcement that is unaware of the drinking
water regulations or we have a nation-wide problem whereby reliability professionals are illegally conducting
water sampling for lead. Either option requires an intervention within the drinking water industry. However,
an intervention cannot be initiated until the issue is first adjudicated by a judge or regulator to identify precisely
under what circumstances, if any, it is permissible to flush a tap prior to pulling a water sample to analyze for
lead. If reliability professionals do not know whether or when it is permissible to pre-flush taps, how can the
public be confident the industry knows how to perform other technical tasks?
The Joint Select Committee report acknowledged a breakdown in the administrative and technical processes
associated with Flint switching its source water from the DWSD to the Flint River. In particular, the state DEQ
made an internal determination, in apparent violation of a state regulation, that “Flint WTP did not have to
immediately utilize corrosion control treatment upon switching to the Flint River as a water source” [Joint Select
Committee on the Flint Water Emergency (Joint Select Committee) (2016), p. 6]. The DEQ did not appear to have
authority to make this determination, and Flint appears to also have had an obligation to perform corrosion
control regardless of whether the state regulators asked for it. None of the recommendations of the Joint Select
Committee directly addresses the lax documentation and implementation of safety processes associated with
starting or maintaining operations at a PWS.
Scheberle (2004) noted that PWSs may not internally retain the expertise required to design new PWS operations. Flint acknowledged this limitation through their hiring of external water experts to initiate the transfer
to the Flint River as a source of water. It is now clear that the correct procedures were never established to perform corrosion control. The system approach to problem analysis would indicate that the lack of procedures
to perform corrosion control initiated the crisis. However, the final report of the Joint Select Committee report
took the person approach to problem analysis with the conclusion “that Flint Public Works personnel were ill
prepared to assume responsibility for the full-time operation of the Flint water treatment plant and distribution system” [Joint Select Committee on the Flint Water Emergency (Joint Select Committee) (2016), p. 19]. If
the correct corrosion control procedures did not exist, and the DEQ knew or should have known about the lack
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of procedures, why are the operators at fault? Instead of faulting operators, the Joint Select Committee could
have advocated for additional resources to fund an effective technical support system for water technicians.
Flint hired external technical experts to assist with their transition from purchasing water from the DWSD to
pumping and treating water from the Flint River. The Michigan attorney general office has initiated a civil suit
against both of the external engineering firms involved. If accurate advice was given and governmental officials
were negligent, then the current process of issuing criminal charges may be sufficient to address the problem.
However, if poor advice was given, it will raise questions for the drinking water industry. For example, it would
be important to analyze why an industry of water experts cannot produce consistently accurate advice.
The Michigan DEQ itself does not seem to know whether a corrosion control plan was in effect at the time
Flint began drawing and treating water from the Flint River. The FOIA request asked for a copy of the corrosion
control plan in order to resolve this discrepancy. However, due to a subpoena, additional information cannot be
released by the Michigan DEQ. (At the time of writing this article, only an interim FOIA denial letter has been
delivered, and it remains possible that some information could be released.) It is clear there was no corrosion
control although it is not clear which of the stated positions of the Michigan DEQ is correct: did they believe
that corrosion control was not needed or did they believe that an appropriate corrosion control plan was in
effect? Although the Joint Select Committee has stated the Michigan DEQ was aware there was no corrosion
control plan, a Michigan DEQ official disputed this claim and future researchers will need to either follow court
proceedings or file a future FOIA request to obtain clarification.
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Conclusion

Professional emergency managers may make the assumption that they do not need to consider threats to the
drinking water system, given that state and local reliability professionals hypothetically may prevent disasters.
However, the Flint crisis has demonstrated that the nation has deep flaws within its drinking water industry.
How many states are unaware of the corrosion control plans that are in use at local PWSs? How many other
states have PWSs that either hired incompetent water experts or ignored the advice of competent water experts?
If water experts or state prosecutors do not know whether it is permissible to pre-flush prior to taking a water
sample for lead, how is it possible to assume that the industry knows how to follow other technical procedures?
Emergency managers cannot be expected to have the technical competence to provide detailed oversight
over PWSs. In addition, when reliability professionals engage in criminal behavior that conceals their actions
it would be difficult for an emergency manager to intervene. However, this paper presented a technique to
inventory drinking water systems through SDWIS and to utilize existing documents in order to identify known
threats to a particular PWS. The methods by which emergency managers reduce risk within their communities
continues to evolve. Emergency managers will need to adapt in order to implement the latest techniques and
assist in the mitigation of disasters.
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